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These days, I must acknowledge a sneaking sympathy for W. H. Auden, who admitted: ‘when I find myself in the company of scientists, I feel like a shabby curate who has wandered by mistake into a room full of dukes’. The extraordinarily rapid advances over the last decade or so within neurobiology, cognitive neuroscience and behaviour genetics pose what many counselling psychologists see as a significant challenge to our existing models of mind and psychotherapeutic practice. Indeed, as a counselling psychologist specialising in psychotherapy, I have increasingly questioned whether, how, and to what extent neuroscience is really the kind of science with which I can or should be doing business. 

Clearly this is a topic that contentiously overlaps with that most familiar and well-worn of debates: that of the distinction between the natural and the human science model (for a discussion in this journal, see eg. Spinelli, 2001; Hart and Kogan, 2003). However, if we are to establish the potential relevance of neuroscientific research for psychotherapeutic practice, I suspect we may have to put such tired old dualisms behind us in order to focus on the arguably more pragmatic task of trying understand how brain and mind might interact to produce subjective experience and psychological distress. My discomfort, therefore, is not only one that stems from a certain trepidation about approaching a highly sophisticated and utterly unfamiliar area in scientific research. My unease also stems from a fear of treading clumsily on the philosophical and epistemological dualisms that prevail within our own profession: dualisms which, if unchallenged, may continue to militate against our thoughtful consideration of ways in which contemporary neuroscientific research may in fact be useful to us, both theoretically and clinically. 

 Much of my thinking stems from a predominantly psychoanalytic perspective. Indeed, the neuroscientific research that is relevant to psychotherapy as a whole appears to be emerging largely from what looks to be a new and fruitful collaboration with psychoanalytic researchers and neuroscientists. This is, of course, an interesting development in its own right. The difficulties of capturing the evanescent unconscious mechanisms originally proposed by Freud, which have continued to be the trademark concern of psychoanalytic theory and practice, have long meant that psychoanalysis has held an empirically equivocal place within science. Certainly, the chance to prove psychoanalysis’s empirical status is one reason, at least, why psychoanalysis has proved to be an eager collaborator with cognitive neuroscience, despite critics who have roundly condemned the attempt (eg. Green, 2000a, Brenman Pick, 2000;Wolff, 2001). However, if we examine some of this research, much of which is grounded in a relational psychoanalytic framework (Mitchell, 2000) that is primarily concerned with issues of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, I think we may find much that is congenial to our interests as counselling psychologists.





In 1985, the early music expert and conductor Clive Wearing was struck by a viral encephalitis at the height of his career. When he recovered from his illness, it was clear that he had suffered a massive anterior anterograde amnesia, which destroyed his hippocampus, attacked his frontal lobes and left him with a complete inability to form new memories. Few who watched ITV’s two very moving documentaries about Wearing’s life, made twenty years apart, will forget the human tragedy of someone who appears to be waking up and acknowledging his own consciousness for the first time every few seconds; who joyfully greets his wife afresh each time she re-enters the room; and who painfully crosses out his own entries in a diary which repetitively state: ‘now I am alive for the first time’ only to write exactly the same thing again.

Wearing’s brain damage, bearing some resemblance to the famous case of H.M reported by Scoville and Milner (1957), reminds us of how closely the tissues of the brain are connected to the activities of the mind. This was the intimate relationship that Freud first noted in his 1895 ‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’, in which he states:

‘The intention is to furnish a psychology that shall be a natural science: that is, to represent psychical processes as quantitatively determinate states of specifiable particles, thus making those processes perspicuous and free from contradiction’.        (p. 87)

Freud’s early career was in neuroanatomy and he made various attempts to develop an understanding of the unconscious workings of the mind in terms of neurophysiology and anatomy. However, the limitations in knowledge and understanding at the time meant that Freud was unable to develop this model significantly and instead chose to work on a means of analysing his patients’ verbal reports of subjective experience.  Solms (1998) has pointed out that it was during his work with Charcot that Freud realised the futility of continuing his original reductionist agenda. The absence of any apparent neurological lesions in patients suffering from hysteria and neurasthenia led Freud eventually to reject the whole notion of concretely localising any mental function anatomically, other than the most basic functions such as vision or hearing. Rather than attempting to explain the complexities of subjective experience in terms of discrete brain mechanisms he chose instead to explore the psychological meaning of clinical syndromes in terms of more complex functional organisations within the brain. Throughout his life, Freud persisted in a belief that psychoanalysis could not be properly allied with neuroscience and biology until the field was sufficiently advanced enough to address the dynamic and distributed nature of mental processes. ‘The deficiencies in our description would probably vanish’ he remarked, ‘if we were already in a position to replace the psychological terms with physiological or chemical ones….We may expect [biology] to give the most surprising information and we cannot guess what answers it will return in a few dozen years to the questions we have put to it. They may be of a kind that will blow away the whole of our artificial structure of hypotheses’. (Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 624).

Despite Freud’s hopes, there has remained a gap, an abyss even, between psychoanalysis and neuroscience for over a century. (Whittle (2000) has offered a terrifically witty discussion of a parallel issue he sees assailing experimental psychology and psychoanalysis). Whilst there are certainly historical and methodological issues perpetuating this fissure, it is the Cartesian divide between brain and mind that seems to be the bedrock of our ambivalence about the putative role of neuroscience in any psychotherapeutic endeavour.  Pulver’s (2001) discussion of the ways in which scientists and philosophers have attempted to resolve this issue rejects both naïve reductionism and dualism, and points to the more pragmatic solution of congruence, a notion that proposes the logic of comparison and compatibility between disciplines. From this perspective, the language of differing disciplines such as neuroscience and psychoanalysis must be such that permit dialogue and meaningful comparison. Fonagy (2003) in the UK and Kandel (1998, 1999) in the US are two vigorous proponents of congruence between these two fields.





Both Clive Wearing and HM, whilst unable to lay down any new memories, were nonetheless able to carry out previously established motor and perceptual skills. Clive Wearing, for example, continued to play the piano, and was able to conduct an orchestra as he had done in the past, albeit without any conscious memory of having earned his living in this way for many years. Such a capacity highlights an increasingly important distinction between implicit and explicit memory, characterised by Westen, (1999) thus:

‘The consensus among cognitive scientists today is that human thought and memory involve at least two systems, one conscious, (called explicit) and the other unconscious (called implicit). Explicit memory involves conscious retrieval of information such as childhood memories or the name of a friend, whereas implicit memory refers to memory that is observable in behaviour but is not consciously brought to mind. One kind of implicit memory is procedural memory…This refers to ‘how to’ knowledge of processes or skills: the motor memory involved in throwing a ball or playing on the piano a complex piece that once required considerable conscious attention, or the behaviourally expressed knowledge of subtle social rules such as how close to stand to another personal in conversation. People typically cannot report how they carry out these procedures, and when they try, their plausible explanations of how they did what they did are often incorrect…’ (pp 1065-66).

The distinction between these two types of memory has been of great interest to contemporary relational psychoanalysts (eg. Mitchell, 2000; Aron 2007; Orbach, 2007) moving away from classical notions of a Freudian unconscious that is constituted by the dynamically repressed aspects of a traumatic past. Instead, the concept of a ‘relational unconscious’ (eg. Davies, 1996; Stolorow and Atwood, 1992b) that is made up of relational schemas, or the ‘unthought known’ (Bollas, 1987) that comes to be played out or enacted within affective-interpersonal schemeas within the therapeutic relationship is foregrounded. One of the best-known proponents of this idea is Dan Stern and the Boston Process of Change Study Group. Stern (1998) and his colleagues have suggested that change in psychotherapy may come about less as a result of conscious, cognitive insight, established via transference interpretation, and more through experiences in the shared implicit relationship between client and therapist. The notion of ‘now moments’ or ‘moments of meeting’ within therapy are thought to carry the potential to alter that shared implicit relationship via a response from the therapist that is recognised by the client as authentic and genuine rather than simply being role-determined. These ‘non-interpretive’ mechanisms, Stern argues, result in new ‘ways of being with’, or procedural mechanisms that do not require conscious understanding or cognitive insight to deliver their therapeutic benefits: the change occurs at an implicit level. Lyons-Ruth (1999) points out that new ‘ways of being with’, which in therapy occur in the ‘enactive’, or procedural domain, destabilise the client’s existing psychological and affective organisations, established via developmental and attachment-related experience (Van Ijzendoorn, 1995; Bretherton, 1988) and offer the possibility of laying down new memories at a non-verbal, non-symbolic level. The centrality of neuro-affective circuitry in the brain is strongly argued by Panksepp (eg. 2003), who suggests that : ‘there are reasons to believe that affective feelings emerge largely from specific subcortical circuits where slowly firing neuronal systems abound, rich in various function-specific neuropeptides that are also abundant in the enteric nervous system of the viscera… emotional responses, including their intrinsic affective attributes, probably emerge from ‘limbic’ regions that are more evolutionarily conserved in vertebrates than those that mediate cognitive capacities’ (p.6). 

There are considerable implications of this kind of work for therapists of diverse theoretical orientations. Not the least is the suggestion that the subcortical structures of the brain such as the amygdala and the limbic circuit that are thought  to subserve the implicit, procedural and affective systems developed through unconscious non-representational experience, are likely to be slow to change: as Greatrex (2002) points out, ‘the intrinsic slow rate of change in subsymbolic schemas suggests that inherent activity is directed toward maintaining embodied form, or, as we used to say, psychic structure’. (p. 190). The laborious task of replacing unconscious affective systems and implicit relational schemas within psychotherapeutic work suggests that where clinical work remains at a predominantly cognitive, explicit level, rather than the affective-implicit level proposed by Stern and his colleagues, it may be in danger of leaving implicit networks intact. (As Westen (2000) points out, this may account in part, at least, for the very high relapse rates in controlled cognitive-behavioural therapy clinical trials). Moreover, the capacity of the therapist to elicit these relational networks in the course of therapeutic work and his or her willingness to explore the client’s experience of salient interactions may be an important facet of therapeutic technique aimed at accessing, regulating and altering implicit affective networks and their associated neurophysiological concomitants. In fact, I think clinicians from varying disciplines and theoretical orientations are beginning to converge in their agreement that the client may benefit from experiencing and tolerating authentic feelings within the therapeutic relationship; so models that downplay the therapist’s relational, affective role may in fact deprive the client of the very feature of therapy that delivers the therapeutic action.


Mental state understanding and mirror neurons

Relational psychotherapeutic work, such as that sponsored by Stern (1998) and others, draws heavily on a two-person psychology, underpinned by a Hegelian philosophy that holds we are formed by and constituted in relation to one another. Relational models of practice are grounded in theoretical assumptions about how we come to understand the existence of mental states in ourselves and others and this has been the topic of considerable work in a variety of fields. From a philosophical perspective, there is Dennett’s (1987) notion of the ‘intentional stance’; from a psychological viewpoint, there is a body of research on what has come to be known as ‘theory of mind’ (eg Baron-Cohen, 1985); and from the developmental and attachment perspective, we have Fonagy and Target’s (1996a and 1996b) concept of mentalisation and the ‘interpersonal interpretive mechanism’. But the recent discovery of mirror neurons (Gallese et al, 1996; Rizzolatti et al 1996) adds considerably to our understanding of the neural basis of empathy and our automatic appreciation of another’s mental experience. Gallese et al (2007) have recently employed the term ‘embodied simulation’ to explain how an individual observing an agent executing motor actions activates the same neural networks in the observer as those activated in the person doing the actions. This was first shown in macaque monkeys, but further research using brain-imaging techniques (eg. Buccino et al, 2001; Iacoboni et al, 1999; Buccino, Vogt et al, 2004) has demonstrated the existence of a mirror neuron system that matches action perception and execution in humans. There is further evidence that a process similar to that of watching motor actions occurs when seeing others’ emotions. Wicker et al’s (2003) fMRI study demonstrated that experiencing disgust and watching someone else mimic the same feeling activates the same neural networks in the anterior insula in both individuals: in other words, the sensori-motor system of the observer seems to automatically reconstruct the feeling experienced in the actor. In fMRI studies of pain, a similar process occurs where the same neural structures subserving the sensory qualities of pain are activated in both the individual experiencing painful sensations and in the observer watching those sensations. Interestingly, however, Gallese et al (2007) point out that the absence of the actor does not appear to prevent the observer from automatically experiencing what another’s pain might feel like:  when asked to imagine, rather than observe, painful stimulation applied to a particular part of the body of an individual now out of sight, only the brain areas that mediate the affective, rather than the sensori-motor quality of pain – ie. the anterior cingulate cortex and the anterior insula – are activated in the individual who is imagining the pain.

Whilst there are arguments critiquing the extent of the role of mirror neurons in our understanding of social cognition and communication (eg. Jacob and Jeannerod 2004; Csibra, 2004), there seems to be a growing body of evidence to suggest that we are, to some extent at least, ‘hard-wired’ to resonate to other peoples’ emotional experience (Gallese, 2003, 2006; Goldman and Sripada, 2005; Saarela et al., 2006). In other words, our understanding of others’ feelings occurs not only, or perhaps not even primarily, via a cognitive, symbolic representation of that experience, as has been suggested by Carruthers and Smith (1996). This ‘theory-theory’ perspective as it has become known, suggests that we establish our understanding of others’ mental states via cognitive construction of a theory of beliefs and desires based on a kind of folk psychology.  The classic ‘simulation’ theory offers the alternative view that we account for others’ mental states by simply imagining ourselves in another’s shoes and generating the likely feelings or emotions in ourselves. But Gallese’s ‘embodied simulation’ account I think offers us a further possibility: that an automatic and  intersubjectively evoked shared neural activation system operating between actor and observer sponsors and underpins subsequent emotional understanding. This is remarkably similar to the phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) observation that: ‘in perceiving the other, my body and his are coupled, resulting in a sort of action that pairs them’ (p.119). 

That a mirror neuron matching system may underwrite the first-person experience of intersubjectivity is likely to become a topic of increasing interest to relational psychoanalysts and psychotherapists. Work by Mitchell (2000), Gill (1994) and Donnel Stern (1983), as well as intersubjective systems theorists such as Stolorow and Atwood, (1992), has decisively shifted the clinical field of inquiry away from an exploration of intra-psychic conflict towards the client-therapist dyad in which both parties are seen to be mutually involved in a reciprocal cycle of affective-interactional sequences. Much attention is now paid to emergent properties of the therapeutic relationship, including concepts such as countertransference and projective identification (Klein, 1946). These help us understand how the therapist’s own emotional responses are evoked, amplified and come to be enacted within the session, both eliciting and responding to the client’s characteristic ‘ways of being’ with others. Indeed, it seems likely that the mirror neuron system may provide the neural basis for these experiences where disowned aspects of the client are projected into the therapist and come to be experienced as the therapist’s own. It may be that research in this area is at last beginning to, quite literally, ‘flesh out’ Freud’s (1915) original account of unconscious communication that simply stated:

‘It is a very remarkable thing that the unconscious of one human can react upon the other without passing through consciousness’ (p. 194)

It is clearly unlikely that the mirror neuron system is a sufficient basis for a modulated, fully-developed capacity for understanding and reflecting on the mind of another.  What is being suggested by the above research, I think, is merely that we have uncovered a neural mechanism that permits a basic level of experiential insight into others’ minds: it suggests that social cognition is not only the result of propositional reasoning or declarative representation of others’ minds. This argues for a two-level system underpinning our awareness of others’ minds: a mirror neuron system that sponsors automatic, basic experiential understanding, and a frontal-cortical system that subserves explicit, declarative awareness. Indeed, Gallese et al (2007) go on to suggest that ‘Embodied simulation scaffolds the propositional, more cognitively sophisticated mind-reading abilities’ (p. 27). It seems likely that in the highly subjective experience, say, of countertransference, it is the involuntary capacity of the therapist first to ‘resonate’ to something of what the client is experiencing as well as cognitively modulating, or ‘marking’ his or her affective response (Gergely and Watson, 1999) that is likely to be therapeutic. (Equally, the client is likely to resonate automatically to the therapist’s responsiveness and to build his or her self-awareness and relational understanding accordingly).  In (clinical) practice, then, the two systems are not mutually exclusive; rather, a fully empathic, intersubjectively-informed understanding of another’s experience will depend on a  predominantly non-linear rather unpredictable process in which interaction and reciprocal feedback within and across differing neurobiological levels is required.

In early childhood, too, both systems are likely to mediate the development of a capacity for mentalisation and affect regulation that has been shown to evolve out of the child’s experience of secure attachment and contingent mirroring interactions with sensitive caregivers (eg. Fonagy 1996; Meins, 1997). These essentially constructivist accounts of mind within contemporary attachment theory appear to intersect with the above neurophysiological mechanisms, raising interesting questions about the possible role of early attachment experience in the development  and maturity of the mirror neuron system. The impact of neglect or trauma in the development of empathy is an obvious future area of clinical and research interest, as is the clinician’s own attachment history in the development of his or her empathic skills and clinical capacities.

Behaviour genetics and psychotherapy

Kandel’s (1998, 1999) immensely provocative and thought-provoking papers have argued for the place of psychiatry and psychotherapy within the context of modern neurobiology. He points out that the reluctance of many social scientists to align themselves with a biological model has been due to a fundamental misunderstanding and unease about the nature and role of genetic factors in human behaviour and a mistaken fear that a biological or genetic model would annihilate any serious consideration of the complex role of environmental factors. In defence of a far more sophisticated reading of neurobiological and genetic influences, Kandel (1998) makes a clear distinction between the template, or transmission function of genes, (that operates beyond individual or social control), and their transcriptional function, (ie. the ability of any given gene to direct the phenotype of a cell), which is responsive to environmental factors, including stress, learning and social interaction. However, Fonagy (2003) suggests, along with Kandel, that the role of social and environmental factors in triggering gene expression that leads to psychological distress is likely to be considerably more complex than has been thought. He argues that gene expression may also be influenced by the way the individual interprets their experience – ie. by the internal, subjectively-experienced environment, just as much as by the external, social environment. ‘The way in which environment is experienced acts as a filter in the expression of the genotype into phenotype, the translation of genetic potential into personality and behaviour’ ( p12). Fonagy (2003) offers some preliminary evidence (Fonagy, Stein and White, 2001) to suggest that in a longitudinal study of a pre-school psychoanalytic treatment programme, one particular variant of the second dopamine-receptor gene (DRD2) interacts with sensitivity to attachment trauma: it was children with this variant of the gene who were most likely to be psychologically disturbed as adults only if they subjectively experienced their childhoods as abusive. This adult disturbance was found to be independent of existing records documenting the individual’s early family environment and levels of dysfunction. It seems possible from this kind of work that we may only just have started to explore the extraordinary complexity and interdependence of gene-environment interactions, and the dynamic developmental pathways to psychological distress.





By now, many of my colleagues, particularly those aligned to the narrative or hermeneutic traditions within psychology, may be feeling thoroughly uncomfortable with this proposed brave new psychotherapeutic world. And of course there are considerable caveats. Let us start by taking the methodology of neuro-imaging, the basis of much of this research. Neuroimaging techniques are in fact very far from accurate representations of a real brain in action; rather, they are a reconstituted visual picture based on the conglomeration of statistical analyses presumed to be correlated with brain structures: it would perhaps be more accurate to think of these images as scientific constructs rather than the brain itself, persuasively concrete though the images may be. Moreover, Beutel et al (2003) point out in their discussion of the technical complexity of neuroimaging research that small differences in study design, image acquisition parameters, processing or analysis, can yield significantly different findings, with very different clinical ramifications. Fuchs (2004) cautions against the static view of the brain promoted by neuro-imaging techniques, pointing out the limitations of what appear in these studies to be single brain states. He argues that consciousness is not an isolated phenomenon, but is embedded within the temporal ebb and flow of life: there is continuous interaction between the brain, the individual and the environment, a continuity which static brain images fail to capture. This is clearly an argument which could be extended to the relevance of neuro-imaging for psychotherapy outcome, since the current emphasis on single brains fails to account for the intrinsically intersubjective nature of psychotherapeutic work, the transitional space, if you like, between client and therapist, and the dyadic nature of therapeutic influence, interaction and change.

However, I think it is likely that many of the above neuro-imaging issues will shortly be overcome with rapidly advancing technology. Far more problematic is the charge that first person subjective experience is, in principle, inaccessible to the third person approach of neuroscience. Where psychotherapy in general and counselling psychology in particular deal with the personal, subjective, intuitive aspects of experience, with self-in-relation, neuroscience at present is not able to tell us anything about the personal meaning of events and experiences or their subjectively felt significance: to use a familiar analogy, knowing everything there is to know about the visual cortex and the neurophysiology of colour still leaves out the subjective experience of the colour red. Perhaps, more fortunately, not knowing anything about the visual cortex does not prevent us from stopping the car at a red traffic light!            (If anything goes wrong with our sight, though, it is extremely useful to know about the neurophysiology of vision).

It is beyond the scope of this paper, and nor am I philosophically qualified, to explore the complex debates about reductionism that these issues raise. However, it may be useful, if contentious, to remind ourselves of E. O. Wilson’s notion of an ‘antidiscipline’, a scientific discipline that acts as a kind of counterpoint, or intellectual ‘other’ to the adjacent more immature parent discipline, challenging its claims and methodology. While many may wish actively to reject the notion that biology rather than, say, philosophy constitutes the antidiscipline for psychology, we should remember that the role of an antidiscipline is not to displace the parent discipline. Nor is it to promote what Dennett (1995) has provocatively described as a ‘greedy’ reductionist philosophy: rather, it provides the parent discipline an opportunity for development and expansion by offering new levels of mechanistic explanation, and new methodologies that potentially inform and enrich our work. Leibniz, three centuries ago, said much the same thing:

I find indeed that many of the effects of nature can be accounted for in a two-fold way, that is to say by a consideration of efficient causes and again independently by a consideration of final causes….Both explanations are good…for the discovery of useful facts in Physics and Medicine. And writers who take these diverse routes should not speak ill of each other…. The best plan would be to join the two ways of thinking. (Discourse on Metaphysics).

Joining the two ways of thinking I suspect will entail breaking down familiar boundaries between differing philosophies and epistemologies that will allow us to draw on insights and procedures from each other. From this pragmatic perspective, research into brain structures alone, without a sophisticated consideration of the psychological meanings and social contexts which shape subjective experience will always be insufficient to adequately account for mental events. But by the same token I think we must also allow the converse to be the case: that a purely psychological, hermeneutic or social constructivist account of mental functioning will always be insufficient to account for and understand psychological distress in the absence of a sophisticated consideration of the neurobiological and genetic mechanisms that subserve, delimit and shape psychological experience.  On this same point, Mitchell and Aron (1999) take issue with what they see as some of the more radical feminist and social constructivist models that appear to downplay or even disregard our biological, embodied selves, and the necessary limits and constraints our individual biological and developmental histories place on any meaningful psychological theory of change. This is increasingly being acknowledged within clinical theory as well. Ilardi and Feldman (2001), our cousins in clinical psychology, have critiqued theoretical accounts that focus only on certain ‘higher level’ aspects of human behaviour. They point out that Beck’s (1967, 1976) cognitive behaviour theory of depression, whilst providing a rationale for how depressive phenomenology is related to systematic cognitive biases in perception, nonetheless fails to account for a variety of other potentially relevant variables, including environmental, social and neurophysiological ones: a failure that they argue has resulted in CBT’s  somewhat equivocal empirical status (cf. Coyne, 1992; Ingram, Miranda and Segal, 1998; Robins and Hayes, 1993). 

Perhaps what I am arguing for on the basis of the research I have attempted very briefly to outline here is a model of mind that permits the co-existence of both naturalistic and social constructivist perspectives; where genetic, neurophysiological, biological, psychological, social and contextual processes all impact on the brain which serves both to transform and to be transformed by our varying experiences. Of course, this is the familiar bio-psycho-social model that many of us acknowledge, and to which many of us pay at least lip-service. But lip-service alone will not move us beyond conceding that these phenomena are all inter-related in some mysterious, yet-to-be articulated way. Rather than exploring our own frankly rather monist views of the world, our own favoured clinical theories and methodologies, perhaps we need to try to establish relationships across differing domains in order to try to articulate the ways in which all these phenomena could be interconnected. 




However successful neuroscience may be in developing increasingly complex methodologies for establishing brain mechanism, it is ill-equipped to generate and develop questions likely to be relevant to clinical practice. So whilst counselling psychology as a discipline must of course continue to address questions appropriate to its own field of interest (the role of evidence-based practice; the role and significance of the therapeutic relationship in psychotherapeutic outcome; the training and development of counselling psychologists and so on), I think it is increasingly likely that we will be expected to articulate the kinds of questions that a psychotherapeutically-informed neuroscience should be addressing. The significance of such practice-led research has been discussed in another context by Corrie (2003) who points out that: ‘it is the phenomenology of our clients’ difficulties that enables us to identify meaningful hypotheses about specific psychological problems’ (p.10). 
For instance, what specific aspects of the subjective experience of depression or anxiety should we be investigating within neuroscience? As counselling psychologists, we may wish to contest the view these conform to DSM1V classifications that are currently the basis of putative brain-imaging correlates. More specifically, how might the operation of a mirror neuron system function in relation to pre-existing implicit relational schemas and templates? In relation to repression, defence, conflict? From a cognitive-behavioural perspective, we might want to consider how working at the explicit, declarative level can impact on or change the client’s problematic implicit relational networks. And there may also be uncomfortable questions asked as neuroscience increasingly supports the intersubjective view both of infant development and of relational clinical work: how, and in what ways, and with what therapeutic effects will the neurophysiological underpinnings and correlates of the therapist’s own subjectivity impact on and resonate with the client’s? 

I suspect, however, there will continue to be a certain resistance in many of us to any such integration or marriage with neuroscience. One reason for this, I think, is partly a question that is relevant in any partnership: that of the laborious necessity of developing, negotiating and articulating a language, an idiom, for discussing issues and problems of mutual concern; a form of communication capable of conveying both the scientific and the subjective, and which can both account for mental phenomena as well as evoke feeling or subjectivity. This dilemma of finding an appropriate language to convey the experience of psychological distress, as well as accounting for its instantiation in brain tissue has been wonderfully depicted – and resolved - by Oliver Sacks (1982) who despairs over ‘whole libraries of papers, couched in the ‘objective’ styleless style de rigueur in neurology; one’s head buzzes with ‘facts’, figures, lists, schedules, inventories, calculations, ratings, quotients, indices, statistics, formulae, graphs and whatnot; everything ‘calculated, cast-up balanced and proved’ in a manner which would have delighted the heart of Thomas Gradgrind. And nowhere, nowhere, does one find any colour, reality, or warmth; nowhere any residue of the lived experience’ (p.207). Here I think the clinical practice and research literature of counselling psychology, particularly its expertise in qualitative methodologies, clearly has much to offer in the elucidation of ‘lived experience’ so evidently missing from much contemporary scientific discourse. 

 Resistance or no, there seems to be accumulating evidence to support the view that we cannot separate our psychological being from our biological and neurophysiological foundations, nor from the complex relational network within which we were created and are now embodied. As counselling psychologists, we do not, of course, have to rush unthinkingly to grasp the dazzling neuro-images that are thrust in front of our eyes; we may wish to tread softly in such unfamiliar territory before engaging in dialogue across traditional - and sometimes cherished -philosophical and epistemological divides. But engage as a profession I hope we do. Dialogue and discussion are a means to creative thinking: interdisciplinary debate a necessary insurance against the potential risks we face of navel-gazing and professional isolation. Opening the channels of communication does not mean we are abandoning our distinctive professional identity, our critique of the medical model, or our overriding commitment to the practitioner-client relationship. However, it may mean abandoning the ‘narcissism of minor differences’ (Freud, 1918a) that can sometimes, I fear, characterise our professional and interdisciplinary debates.

I have tried to touch on some of the ways in which contemporary neuroscientific research might contribute to the possibility of a more integrated understanding of psychological processes relevant to our clinical theory and practice. I’m sure it is obvious that we are only at the beginning of such an enterprise, and I will be interested to see how counselling psychologists, in their various ways, will want to contribute to it. 

Rosemary Rizq.
Principal Lecturer in Counselling Psychology
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